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Chapter 4
Canadian Progress and the British Connection:
Why Canadian Historians Seeking the
Middle Road Should Give 2½ Cheers for
the British Empire
Andrew Smith
On a visit to London in July 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper extolled the
positive aspects of British imperialism and declared that the ‘actions of the British
Empire’ in Canada ‘were largely benign and occasionally brilliant’. Conceding
that no part of the world has been unscarred by the ‘excesses of empires’, he sug-
gested that we discard the currently fashionable view that ‘colonialism’ was
inherently bad. In his speech, Harper traced many features of Canadian society
back to Britain. These included a belief in private enterprise, a relatively humane
Aboriginal policy and a glorious military heritage that has often involved close
cooperation with our American ‘cousins’.1
Although they came from a politician rather than an academic, Harper’s com-
ments help to frame the scholarly debates surveyed in this chapter and to show
their political significance. Some academics suggest that the British impact on
Canada was generally negative and perhaps something of which British people
and their descendents should feel ashamed. Another perspective stresses the pos-
itive and calls on us to reject what one Australian historian has labelled the ‘black
armband’ view of the colonial past.2 My own view is that Harper’s view of
British imperialism is closer to the truth than the opinions voiced by many
Canadian historians. British imperialism brought significant benefits to Canada
which are sometimes obscured by the tendency of Canadian historians to focus
on the negative aspects of their nation’s history. By most statistical measures,
Canada is one of the world’s most successful countries.3 It is possible to dismiss
1 ‘Address by the Prime Minister at the Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce’, Prime Minister’s
Office Listserv, 14 July 2006. I would like to thank David Cannadine, Ged Martin, and J. Andrew
Ross for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 G. Blainey, ‘Drawing Up a Balance Sheet of Our History’, Quadrant, vol. 37, no.7–8 (1993), pp.
10–15.
3 Canada has the sixth highest entry on the Human Development Index. See United Nations
Development Programme, 2006 Human Development Report (New York, 2006).
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statistical indicators such as the Human Development Index as value-laden and
culturally specific. Perhaps many Canadian historians will incline to this view.
But the ability of Canada to attract immigrants of varied cultural backgrounds
suggests that these rankings of countries do indeed reflect reality. In a sense,
everyone who gets on a plane to immigrate to Canada or Australia is voting with
their feet in favour of nineteenth-century British imperialism.
Understanding how Canada became a success story ought to be a major
research focus of the Canadian historical profession. For reasons that include an
understandable desire to document their country’s shortcomings, Canadian
historians have neglected the important task of explaining the reasons for
Canada’s relative success. Although there is plenty of room to debate the rela-
tive importance of other factors, any credible explanation for Canada’s success
must acknowledge the significant role played by Britain. The great unwritten
work of Canadian history is entitled: ‘How a land with severe winters became a
prosperous and stable G7 country’. If such a book were ever written, it is prob-
able that Britain and its institutions would feature prominently in the first few
chapters. This chapter will survey several frameworks for understanding the
history of the British Empire and will suggest that Canadian historians can draw
on these theories to help explain Canada’s achievements.
Much is at stake in the scholarly debate on how we should view Britain’s role
in Canadian history. Whether we regard the British legacy in Canada as largely
positive or largely negative has implications that extend far beyond the compar-
atively trivial question of whether to retain Canada’s current head of state. At
issue are our conceptions of social and economic progress, our views of Canada’s
place in a globalised world and our understandings of the nature of empire. By
‘empire’, I refer not merely to the British Empire or to the American Empire,
but to empire as a generic concept that includes any globe-spanning system of
power, trade and allegiance.
This chapter seeks to defend the basic idea that Britain’s impact on Canada
was largely positive while showing that there are several possible intellectual
routes by which one can arrive at this position. It also argues that if Canadian
historians are to arrive at a balanced view of the impact of British imperialism,
they will need to reconnect with political and economic theory. The chapter
begins with an assessment of the recent scholarship on Canada and the British
World. It argues that Canadian historians need to engage with the various inter-
pretive frameworks for understanding empire’s legacies that have recently been
advanced by social scientists. The available frameworks range from Marxian
world-systems theory to the New Institutional Economics to the latest ways of
thinking about economic culture. No single interpretive framework can fully
describe the Anglo-Canadian connection. However, if taken together, these
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04_Canadian_075-097 13/2/09 16:51 Page 76
competing frameworks can guide future research on Britain’s relationship with
the lands that became Canada. The makers of these overarching theories would
also benefit from engagement by Canadian historians because Canada’s past
provides a vast amount of empirical data for testing, refining and, if necessary,
falsifying general statements about the nature of imperialism.
Assessing the impact of British imperialism in Canada requires us to think
about two separate but related issues. First, we need to consider the ways in
which British imperialism contributed to the emergence of the Canadian nation-
state (the obvious counterfactual alternative being absorption into the United
States). Luckily, military and political historians have written extensively on such
topics as the War of 1812 and the Alaska boundary dispute. Indeed, the British
Empire is central to the major meta-narratives in Canadian constitutional and
diplomatic history (e.g., colony to nation, empire to umpire).4 Anyone remotely
familiar with Canadian political and military history knows that Britain played a
crucial role in laying the foundations of a separate nation on the northern half of
the North American continent. The second, and perhaps more interesting, set of
questions relates to the internal life of the polity that was cobbled together in the
nineteenth century from what remained of Britain’s North American Empire.
Unfortunately, the impact of the British connection on the evolution of
Canadian society has been the object of much less study. Perhaps this is because
the rise of social history after 1970 coincided with a decreasing level of interest
in the role of Britain in Canadian history.
Saying that the British Empire had a positive impact on Canada is under-
standably controversial. Today, few would try to justify the dispossession of
indigenous peoples by land-hungry settlers. Recent comparative histories have
underscored the fact that the experiences of Canadian First Nations were part
of a global pattern of oppression by the British that manifested itself on other
continents, including Australia.5 Moreover, the British and their descendents
mistreated people of other European ethnicities (the Acadian deportation comes
to mind). Indeed, we are increasingly aware of the costs that empire imposed
even on Canadians of British descent. Today, few would suggest that Canada’s
national interest was at stake in the First World War or that the sending of
Canadian conscripts to the trenches of Flanders was one of the country’s proud-
est moments. Nevertheless, all of these negatives need to be weighed against the
many good things that Britain did for Canada.
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4 N. Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto,
1994).
5 K.S. Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (London, 2004);
J.C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–1900 (Kingston,
2003).
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The Historiography of Canada and the British World:
Strengths and Limitations
Evaluating the thesis that the British Empire laid the foundations for Canada’s
subsequent success is complicated by the many lacunae in the historiography.
These lacunae are a function of the fact most historians lost interest in the
imperial dimensions of Canadian history around 1960. In his 1993 presidential
lecture to the Canadian Historical Association, Phillip Buckner bemoaned the
estrangement of Canadian history from British imperial history. Buckner con-
demned the fact that Canada had largely disappeared from the historical writing
in Britain on the history of empire. Whereas the constitutional evolution of
Canada and the other colonies of settlement had once dominated historical writ-
ing on the British Empire, the 1960s and 1970s had witnessed a shift in focus to
the British imperial experience in Africa and India.6 Buckner called for Canada
to be reintegrated into the story as told in Britain. At the same time, he appealed
to Canadian historians ‘to place the imperial experience back where it belongs,
at the centre of nineteenth-century Canadian history’. Buckner was not calling
for a return to the days when constitutional history was king, but he was asking
historians to investigate Britain’s manifold impact on Canada’s politics, economy
and society.7
Buckner’s remarks came after several decades in which the British role in
Canadian history had been largely ignored. The most obvious reason for the
de-emphasis of the British connection by historians was English Canada’s
redefinition of itself after 1945. During the formative years of the Baby Boom
generation, Canada shed many symbols of its British heritage, including the
Red Ensign.8 The increasing irrelevance of Britain to Canada was especially
pronounced in the economic sphere: after 1963, the British option ceased to be
seriously considered by Canadian policymakers seeking to limit trade depen-
dence on the United States.9 The lack of interest in Britain’s role in Canadian
history was also a function of the shifting interests of historians. During the
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6 One imperial historian who swam against this current was Ged Martin at the University of
Edinburgh.
7 Later printed in P.A. Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened to the British Empire?’ Journal of the
Canadian Historical Association, vol. 3, no. 1 (1993), pp. 3–32.
8 J.E. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945–71
(Vancouver, 2006).
9 B.W. Muirhead, The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: the Failure of the Anglo-European
Option (Kingston, 1992), pp. 163–177. Perhaps the academic debate over the precise causes of British
economic decline that raged in this period made it difficult for historians to envision the days of
British economic supremacy. D. Edgerton, ‘The Decline of Declinism’, Business History Review, vol.
71, no.2 (1997), pp. 201–6.
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heyday of narrative political history, debates about the nature of the British
impact on Canada had preoccupied Canadian historians, as Anglophile scholars10
clashed with those who stressed the need for Canadian autonomy from Britain.11
Because they eschewed broad narratives, the newer forms of history that came
to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., women’s history, gay history, labour
history) refrained from making broad ‘macro’ statements about the British
impact on Canada, although they illuminated particular facets of this topic (e.g.,
the social history of British sailors in Canadian ports).12 Similarly, while the ‘clio-
metric revolution’ in Canadian economic history illuminated particular aspects
of the Anglo-Canadian relationship, it did not produce any grand statements
about whether Canada’s close association with Britain fostered or hindered
Canada’s overall economic development.13
One historian who ventured to make general statements was Jack Granatstein.
In 1988, he argued that Britain’s economic decline in the twentieth century made
Canada’s drift into the American sphere virtually inevitable. His aim was to defend
the conduct of the Liberal governments that had presided over Canada’s deeper
integration into the continental economy after 1945. Granatstein, however, did
not grapple with the question of how this diplomatic reorientation influenced the
internal life of the country.14 He might have looked at questions of business
culture, secularisation and social policy. Indeed, aside from the First Nations his-
torians who argued that European colonialism was immoral and unjustified,15 few
historians after 1970 made broad generalisations about the British impact on
Canadian society. Quebec academic historians de-emphasised the Conquest by
stressing that French Canada was a ‘normal’ western society. As a result, the British
impact on French Canada’s social structure, a topic once debated vigorously by
historians of eighteenth-century Canada, became less central.16
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10 D. Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada, 1939–1957 (Toronto, 1976); W.L. Morton, The
Kingdom of Canada (Toronto, 1963).
11 A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: a History of Canada (Toronto, 1946); R.D. Francis, ‘Historical
perspective on Britain: the ideas of Canadian historians Frank H. Underhill and Arthur R.M. Lower’,
in P. Buckner and R.D. Frajcis (eds.), Canada and the British World:Culture, Migration and Identity
(Vancouver, 2006), pp. 309–21.
12 J. Fingard, Jack in Port: Sailortowns of Eastern Canada (Toronto, 1982).
13 Perhaps this is because cliometric economic history was focused on points of detail, such as chart-
ing the annual fluctuations in Canada’s balance of payments. The field of economic history was rev-
olutionised in the 1960s, when the older qualitative approach was supplanted by a much more
quantitative approach known as cliometrics. T.J.O. Dick and J.E. Floyd, Canada and the Gold
Standard: Balance-of-Payments Adjustment, 1871–1913 (Cambridge, 1992).
14 J.L. Granatstein, How Britain’s Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States (Toronto,
1989).
15 K.S. Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (London, 2004).
16 R. Rudin, Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec (Toronto, 1997), pp. 171–218.
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But since 1993, historians on both sides of the Atlantic appear to have heeded
Buckner’s call to action. The British World conferences have helped to refocus
attention on the comparative histories of the so-called ‘White Dominions’.17
The Canadian experience figures prominently in a recent study of the develop-
ment of the ‘imperial press system’ by Simon J. Potter, a historian based in
Ireland.18 David Cannadine considers Canada in his examination of British
attempts to replicate parts of their class system in the settlement colonies.19
Canada and the other self-governing colonies are emphasised in Andrew
Thompson’s study of the empire’s impact on British society.20 Bernard Porter has
argued that ordinary Britons interacted mainly with the colonies of settlement
and the United States, rather than with Britain’s tropical empire. Porter thereby
critiques the recent generation of British imperial historians who have focused
on the tropical empire as the key to understanding the emergence of Britain’s
national identity.21 He also targets postcolonialist historians such as Catherine
Hall as particularly prone to exaggerate the importance of the non-white empire
to the British.22
British imperial historians’ re-engagement with Canada has been mirrored by
developments within the Canadian historical community. Carman Miller’s work
on Canada and the Boer War has helped to revive interest in Canadian imperi-
alism.23 The evolution of Canada’s honours system has also received attention
from Christopher McCreery and others.24 The older literature on Canadian
imperialism ignored the topic of gender.25 This lacuna has been remedied by
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17 Buckner and Francis (eds.), Canada and the British World.
18 S.J. Potter, News and the British World: the Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876–1922
(Oxford, 2003), p. 121.
19 D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire (Oxford, 2001).
20 A. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back: the Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the mid-Nineteenth
Century (London, 2005), p. 3.
21 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004),
pp. 70–2.
22 C. Hall, K. McClelland and J. Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the
British Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge, 2000); C. Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the
English imagination, 1830–1867 (Cambridge, 2002); B. Ashcraft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin, Post-
Colonial Studies: the Key Concepts (London, 2000).
23 Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902 (Kingston,
1993).
24 C. McCreery, The Canadian Honours System (Toronto, 2005); J. Andrew Ross, ‘All this Fuss and
Feathers: Plutocrats, Politicians and Changing Canadian Attitudes to Titular Honours’, in Colin
Coates (ed.), Majesty in Canada: Essays on the Role of Royalty (Toronto, 2006), pp. 119–41.
25 C. Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867–1914 (Toronto,
1970); H.B. Neatby, ‘Laurier and Imperialism’, in H. Blair Neatby (ed.), Imperial Relations in the Age
of Laurier (Toronto, 1969), pp. 1–9.
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Katie Pickles’ study of the IODE26 and Mark Moss’s monograph on masculinity
and militarism in pre-1914 Ontario.27 Adele Perry has connected the culture of
empire to another fundamental issue in Canadian history, namely, native-
newcomer relations.28 In the last decade or so, our understanding of the British
impact on Canada has become much richer. As a result, we are now in a some-
what better position to assess whether the impact of the British Empire on
Canada was largely positive or largely negative.
Problems with the Post-1993 British World Literature
The flurry of literature on the Anglo-Canadian relationship is both encouraging
and frustrating. While it is encouraging that historians are again thinking about
the relationship between Britain and Canada, the British world literature has
some severe limitations. One of them is that the choice of topics by social his-
torians has skewed our understanding of the British Empire’s impact on Canada
by over-emphasising its negative features. For instance, Mark Moss has shown
that imperialism and militarism were linked to a particularly regressive concep-
tion of masculinity. Adele Perry has studied the decidedly negative impact of
empire on natives. These studies are valuable. But there is another side to the
story and so far no one has investigated whether British imperialism made
Canadians more democratic or entrepreneurial than they would otherwise have
been. Indeed, the post-1993 British world historiography has left political, eco-
nomic and constitutional themes largely untouched. For instance, the place of
Canada in British geopolitical strategy has been largely ignored by British world
historians.29 Just before the First World War, the influential British geographer
Halford Mackinder declared that the economic centre of the British Empire
would lie in Canada rather than in London in a generation.30 The fact that such
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26 K. Pickles, Female Imperialism and National Identity: Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire
(Manchester, 2002).
27 M. Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War (Don Mills,
2001).
28 A. Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849–1871
(Toronto, 2001).
29 The subject was, however, considered in the 1990s by J. Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and Schurman:
Imperial Defence in the Post-Crimean Era, 1856–1905’, in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds.),
Far-Flung-Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1996),
pp. 27–54.
30 H. Mackinder, ‘Geographical Conditions Affecting the British Empire: I. The British Islands’,
Geographical Journal no. 33 (1909) pp. 462–76, 474.
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predictions were made at the time is surely worthy of our consideration, as are
the many economic bonds that linked Canada and Britain in this era. However,
aside from Gregory Marchildon’s brilliant study of Max Aitken’s financial
career,31 the recent historiography has essentially ignored the economic aspects
of the British world and has focused on the subjective identities of
contemporaries. More attention could have been paid to how the ‘imagined
communities’ of the past influenced and were influenced by flows of labour,
capital and consumer goods.32
In addition, British world scholars have not really wrestled with the question
of the extent to which the ‘British world’ included the United States. Thinking
about this issue is crucial if we are to separate Britain’s impact on North America
as a whole from Britain’s influence on Canada. The historical literature of the
1950s was marked by a tension between Donald Creighton’s emphasis on
Britain’s rivalry with the United States and the more inclusive Atlanticism of
Winston Churchill’s ‘English-speaking peoples’.33 Historians of our generation
need to think about whether the Canada-US border marked the boundary of the
British world as an imagined community. Evidence both for and against this
hypothesis can be found.
A more important difficulty with the recent literature is that historians of
Canada are still failing to draw on interpretive frameworks that could add a com-
parative perspective and highlight the empire’s beneficent aspects. Historians are
right to be sceptical of grand theories of global history, but if we are to under-
stand the impact of the British Empire on Canada, we should at least consider
whether any of these frameworks is useful. However, deciding which paradigm
is most suitable for Canadian historians is complicated because scholars of inter-
national renown have advanced several competing frameworks for understand-
ing empire. In the next section of the chapter, I will sketch each framework
or ‘lens’ and then suggest how it might be applied to the practical task of writ-
ing Canadian history. The scholars of chief importance include defenders
of empire such as Deepak Lal and Niall Ferguson; the human rights scholar
Michael Ignatieff; students of empire’s relationship to race, class, and ethnicity;
neo-classical economists who criticise empire; and scholars who discuss the
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31 G.P. Marchildon, Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the Gilded Age of Canadian Finance (Toronto,
1996).
32 That identities influence economic behaviour is acknowledged in C. Tait, ‘Brushes, Budgets,
and Butter: Canadian Culture and Identity at the British Empire Exhibition, 1924–25’, in Buckner
and Francis (eds.), Canada and the British World, pp. 234–349.
33 W. Churchill, History of the English-Speaking Peoples (Toronto, 1956–58). Churchill’s emphasis
on Anglo-Saxon fraternal unity has recently been revived by the popular historian A. Roberts, A
History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900 (London, 2006).
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relationship between culture and economic performance. None of these lenses
gives us a perfect view, but all have some merit. Moreover, all of these lenses
allow us to see the positive aspects of the British Empire and suggest that
Canadian historians should re-evaluate their generally negative views of British
imperialism.
Lenses for Viewing the History of Empire
Thinking about the Anglo-Canadian relationship requires us to consider why
Britain became the world’s dominant power by 1815. This question in turn
forces us to think about competing causal explanations for European global
hegemony. Before we can begin to make moral or other evaluations about the
British or European impact on Canada, we should understand the processes by
which Europeans acquired global power. Some academics believe that the rise
of the west was simply an accident of biology or global meteorology, a matter of
microbes or climate change. In their eyes, had a few natural variables been dif-
ferent, other continents might have colonised Europe rather than vice versa.34
The theories that underscore the importance of natural forces are useful
because they help to problematise what was once regarded as common sense,
namely, that western dominance was the result of functionally superior eco-
nomic and social institutions. The advantages of western institutions versus non-
western institutions in a given epoch are matters that needs to be proven or
disproved with evidence, not simply assumed, and Alfred Crosby and Jared
Diamond are right to challenge ethnocentric notions of cultural superiority. But
while many historians are willing to concede that fortuitous natural factors
played a role in the global rise of Britain, few are willing to attribute everything
to social exogenous variables, be they smallpox epidemics or England’s large coal
deposits. Even Marx’s so-called materialist theory of history recognised that non-
material factors such as ideologies and political structures played an important
role in history.35 The thesis that western dominance may have been partly due
to superior institutions is certainly considered by Ernest Jones, the widely
respected author of The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics
in the History of Europe and Asia. Jones tells the rags-to-riches tale of how a minor
extension of the Eurasian continent was able to rise to global economic and
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34 A.W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: the Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (Cambridge,
1986); J. Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York, 1997);
G. Stokes, ‘The Fates of Human Societies: A Review of Recent Macrohistories’, American Historical
Review, vol. 106, no. 2 (2001), pp. 508–25.
35 G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: a Defense (Princeton, 1978), pp. 364–88.
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cultural dominance by 1900. Jones’s argument incorporates socially exogenous
factors such as climate change and epidemics, but he maintains that post-
medieval Europe’s political institutions were also part of the explanation.36
If Jones’s argument that Europe’s rise to global dominance was a function of
superior political institutions is correct, it lends credence to the view advanced
by other scholars that European imperialism benefited people living in overseas
colonies by allowing for the diffusion of those institutions. Let us consider the
arguments of those who stress the merits of European imperialisms (including the
imperialism of the British Empire). Perhaps the strongest defender of empire is
Deepak Lal. His main targets are Marxian scholars who argue that empire
enriches the colonisers at the expense of the colonised and liberals who say that
empire hurts both the imperialist country and the territories it governs. The
account of empire provided by Marxian historians such as Immanuel Wallerstein
will also be familiar to many readers. Wallerstein and his followers assert that
colonialism was instrumental in the creation of a global economic system con-
sisting of an exploiting core and periphery of commodity producing regions.37
The liberal critique of empire has a long pedigree: as early as the middle of the
eighteenth century, people in Britain were arguing that the acquisition of over-
seas colonies harmed Britain itself.38 Lal maintains that both camps are wrong and
that imperialism confers benefits all round, to the colonised as well as the
colonisers. Lal argues not that the rulers of empires are more benevolent than the
rulers of small states but that large polities are beneficent because they achieve
political stability. They do so, according to him, by eliminating local conflicts,
which, in turn, promotes security of the person, long-distance commerce, and
durable property rights. Lal regards all empires as functional, but suggests that
the empires established by western peoples offered their residents more benefits
than non-western empires. Lal singles out the British and American Empires as
particularly praiseworthy in this regard.39
Lal’s interpretation suggests that British (and later American) imperialism has
benefited people living in what is now Canada. There is certainly some plausi-
bility to what Lal is saying about the advantages of large polities versus small
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36 E. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and
Asia, 3rd edition (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 104–26.
37 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974); K. Pommeranz, The Great Divergence:
China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000); A. Gunder Frank,
Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, 1998).
38 E. Rothschild, ‘Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth
Century Provinces’, Modern Intellectual History, vol. 1, no. 1 (Apr. 2004), pp. 3–25, 21.
39 D. Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order (London, 2004).
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ones. Canadian exporters, missionaries and travellers have been major beneficia-
ries of the two liberal empires Lal describes. Moreover, Canada is itself large
enough to be considered a form of empire: the efforts of Sir John A. Macdonald
and others to build a transcontinental Dominion that rivalled the United States
produced a political unit that dwarfed both the pre-Contact Aboriginal polities
and the separate colonies that joined Confederation. The imperial and sub-
imperial projects pursued in the past confer benefits on ordinary people today.
For instance, thanks to the ambitions of Macdonald and his contemporaries, it is
now possible to travel across Canada without showing a passport or changing
money. Most people would say that this mobility is a good thing.
Lal’s analysis is, however, not wholly convincing because he glosses over the
substantial differences between the many empires he surveys. Even the two
English-speaking powers he considers exhibited major differences. The British
Empire included vast territories that were formally British as well as extensive
spheres of influence. The American reluctance to admit the reality of empire has
made the United States unwilling to annex its overseas territories, even de facto
colonies such as Guantanamo Bay.40 Moreover, if we accept Lal’s premise that big-
ger polities are better, then Britain’s efforts to build up the Dominion of Canada
as a rival to the United States appear somewhat retrogressive. If Lal’s ‘bigger is bet-
ter’ philosophy is correct, then Goldwin Smith’s proposal for a single North
American nation was more progressive than the nationalism of Sir John A.
Macdonald. Another problem with Lal’s analysis is that he fails to come to grips
with the convincing argument that the existence of many small polities can be ulti-
mately beneficial. For example, Ernest Jones has argued that Europe’s political
fragmentation contributed to its ability to catch up and eventually surpass China in
the spheres of commerce, seafaring, and general technological prowess. Medieval
Europe’s failure to acquire a central ruling authority analogous to China’s Emperor
was crucial, he says, because the benefits of commercial and technical competition
outweighed the costs of fragmentation (which included intermittent warfare and
intra-European trade barriers).41 Lal does not really consider the downsides of
empires and if we are to arrive at a more balanced view of the British Empire’s
costs and benefits, we need to turn to other interpretative frameworks.
Niall Ferguson’s more sophisticated defence of empire takes some of the pos-
sible rejoinders to Lal into account. The British Empire described by Ferguson
combined vast scale with polyarchic diversity, with the colonial mini-Parliaments
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ensuring a degree of local autonomy not seen in the far-flung dominions of
Habsburg Spain. Ferguson’s framework is more believable than that of Lal
because he firmly distinguishes liberal empires (chiefly Victorian Britain and the
twentieth-century United States) from the pre-liberal empires that characterised
human history before 1800. Ferguson also separates the pre-1800 British Empire
from the Second British Empire. He does not rehabilitate the former but does
argue that the empire of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries enhanced the
interests of the human race as a whole and increased total world product.42
Ferguson uses the history of abolitionism to make a general point about
Britain’s transition from an empire of oppression to an empire of liberalism: he
shows that the British went from dealing in slaves to suppressing slavery within
a few decades. In 1807, Parliament banned the shipment of new slaves across the
Atlantic in British vessels. Abolitionist lobby groups won subsequent victories,
forcing white colonists in the Caribbean to free their human property, sending
the Royal Navy to interdict foreign slaving ships and eventually suppressing slav-
ery in the interior of Africa.43 Ferguson argues that liberty in a broader sense was
also advanced by the British Empire after 1800, maintaining that important free-
doms were implanted in both the neo-British societies of the Dominions and in
the countries of the tropical empire. He links this shift in empire’s outcomes to
changes within the metropole, most notably gradual democratisation and the
progressive extension of economic liberty.
By the Victorian period, Britain had a two-party system, an advanced capital-
ist economy, an active press and a vibrant civil society. These are features shared
with the United States, the country that succeeded the British Empire as the
global hegemon between 1914 and 1945.44 Ferguson argues that the American
Empire has promoted liberty in much the same way as the British Empire. In
fact, he wants the United States to become even more imperialist and bemoans
the American tendency to abandon imperial projects whenever costs escalate.
Appealing to the Americans’ sense of enlightened self-interest, Ferguson argues
that the British Empire was a positive-sum game that benefited Britain and her
colonies. Paul Kennedy argued in the 1980s that great powers decline when
‘imperial over-stretch’ overburdens their economies.45 Ferguson replies that the
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real problem with the American Empire is ‘under-stretch,’ with too much but-
ter and not enough guns. He says that implanting liberal democracy overseas pays
long-term dividends for both the imperialist power and the overseas colonies.
Ferguson’s upbeat view of empire relies heavily on concepts taken from the
New Institutional Economics (NIE), a school of thought that holds that a strong
state willing to protect individual rights rather than simply laissez-faire is the pre-
requisite for capitalist industrial development. The NIE emerged in the 1970s in
reaction to the limitations of the narrowly quantitative economic history that
flourished in the 1960s.46 Convinced that fortuitous natural endowments were
of secondary importance in explaining national differences in per capita wealth,
Douglass C. North and Mancur Olson asked economic historians to look at the
political and legal institutions that were, in their eyes, the real foundations of
development.47 North and Olson argued that Europe, and particularly Britain,
prospered because they were the first countries to evolve the type of institutions,
particularly more secure property rights, that promoted faster technological
progress and economic growth.48
Ferguson’s institutional analysis is helpful in answering a major question of
historical causation: why was the British Empire able to overtake the other
European overseas empires between 1700 and 1815? Stuart England was a
second-rate power and historians have long sought to explain how ‘England’s
apprenticeship’ in the seventeenth century gave way to the Pax Britannica-
‘Workshop of the World’ era of the nineteenth.49 Moreover, Ferguson’s empha-
sis on the liberalism of the Victorian Empire is consistent with Ian McKay’s thesis
that the Canadian project of building a transcontinental British Dominion was
fundamentally about advancing the ideology of liberal individualism and private
property.50 Canadian historians who see McKay’s ‘liberal order’ concept as a
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plausible interpretive framework for Canadian history will probably agree with
Ferguson’s description of the British Empire even if they reject his neo-liberal
value assessments and normative statements.
Ferguson’s interpretation has weaknesses as well as strengths. A major prob-
lem with his account of empire is that he discounts human rights abuses by the
two liberal empires as regrettable but isolated incidences. Many First Nations his-
torians would regard the very process of seizing territory as inherently immoral,
regardless of the colonisers’ behaviour on subordinate ius in bello issues such as
the treatment of prisoners. Moreover, Ferguson’s emphasis on the continuities
and affinities between British and American imperialism will not ring true for
many Canadians: did not British and American troops fight on Canadian soil?
One can dismiss the war of 1812 as something that happened before Britain and
the United States became fully liberal or fully democratic (if they ever did), but
it nevertheless problematises Ferguson’s notion of Anglo-American amity and
the related concept of the liberal democratic peace.51
Furthermore, a close examination of the historical record tends to falsify
Ferguson’s thesis that the British Empire promoted globalisation and freer
markets. In reality, the British Empire promoted a form of regulated, semi-
protectionist capitalism. It is certainly true that British imperialism opened parts
of the non-western world to the global economy. Something similar happened
in the early stages of Canadian history, but in post-Responsible Government
Canada, as in Australasia, membership of the British Empire was eminently com-
patible with American-style tariffs. Protectionist tariffs are the antithesis of eco-
nomic liberalism and globalisation. Indeed, the Canadians who complained the
most about the end of British mercantilism in the 1840s were later among the
strongest proponents of a national policy.52 Sir John A. Macdonald’s Anglophilia
did not extend to the classical political economy of Ricardo and Mill.53 The
British preferential tariff Canada introduced in 1897 exacerbated Anglo-German
tensions and contributed to the collapse of the liberal trade regime in pre-war
Europe.54 And in the interwar and post-1945 periods, imperialist sentiment in
Canada reinforced the Commonwealth-wide tendency towards collectivism and
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protectionism exemplified by the Ottawa Economic Conference.55 The heyday
of the British Commonwealth also saw the establishment of the (state-owned)
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation56 and Diefenbaker’s dirigiste trade diversion
strategy.57 Perhaps ‘liberal imperialism’ is a true oxymoron, destined from the
start to collapse under the weight of its inherent self-contradiction.58
The evidence that the British Empire encouraged Canadians to adopt statist-
interventionist economic policies calls into question Ferguson’s argument that
British imperialism advanced the causes of economic liberalism and free markets.
But liberalism is much more than an economic philosophy: it is a belief system
with implications for a host of non-economic issues, such as the treatment of
minorities and the rights of the accused in criminal matters. Perhaps the most
plausible arguments in defence of the British Empire are those that revolve around
non-economic matters. These arguments are the focus of the next section.
Empire and Human Rights
It is clear that Ferguson’s interpretive framework has major flaws insofar as it
attempts to describe the economic aspects of the British Empire. But a somewhat
more plausible defence of liberal empire has been advanced by Michael Ignatieff.
Ignatieff argues that societies lucky enough to have evolved advanced codes of
human rights have a duty to spread liberal values such as security of the person,
religious tolerance and gender equality. He argues that war and governance by
outsiders are sometimes the only means of protecting the human rights of indi-
viduals living in other cultures. He suggests that if we are to avoid the pitfall of
moral relativism, we must sometimes adopt a quasi-imperialist way of thinking.
Ignatieff defines himself as a qualified admirer of the British Empire and argues
that British imperialism sometimes advanced the cause of human rights.59
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For Canadian historians, Ignatieff’s ‘values imperialism’ raises a number of
important theoretical questions. Until recently, Canadian policy towards
Aboriginals was frankly assimilationist and aimed at the extinction of native lan-
guages. Although Tom Flanagan of the University of Calgary has recently
attempted to extrapolate a justification for ‘cultural imperialism’ out of values
imperialism,60 this is certainly not Ignatieff’s agenda. Ignatieff does not attempt
to justify attempts to impose Christianity and the English language on Canada’s
First Nations. But Ignatieff’s theory of universal human rights can be used to jus-
tify other British actions or policies in Canada. For instance, Barry Gough has
shown that the heavy guns of the Royal Navy were crucial in suppressing slav-
ery in the Aboriginal communities of British Columbia.61 Ignatieff’s framework
suggests that, in this context, British naval power promoted human rights. Ian K.
Steele’s research on Iroquois treatment of prisoners during the Seven Years’ War
has shown that the contemporary European code of warfare was very much a
cultural construct.62 Eighteenth-century European ideas regarding the treatment
of prisoners of war were much closer to the values embodied in modern inter-
national law than those of the First Nations of that period. Ignatieff’s framework
therefore suggests that the establishment of Euro-Canadian hegemony in eastern
North America was a positive development from a human rights point of view.
Of course, one can share Ignatieff’s belief that liberal values are of universal
validity while rejecting his view that liberal empire is an efficient means of pro-
moting human rights. Some critics of today’s liberal imperialism use quantitative
analysis to test whether liberal imperialism fulfils its humanitarian promises.63
Canadian historians can borrow this approach. They should also consider where
the ideas of pre-Contact Aboriginals were, in some spheres, more ‘advanced’
than those of the Europeans. Establishing a methodology for assessing the
humanitarian costs and benefits of British colonialism in Canada is a topic far
outside the remit of this chapter. However, a recent work by David Abernethy
provides some guidelines for how this might be done without the debate degen-
erating into the competitive accumulation of anecdotal data.64
Ignatieff’s belief that the British Empire may have advanced human rights in
some instances raises the complex question of the connection between racism
and imperialism. Many Canadian historians will incline to the view that Canada’s
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membership in the Empire-Commonwealth reinforced WASP (White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant) supremacy within Canada. But we should consider whether
countervailing tendencies were at work. Britain’s concessions to French
Catholics after 1760 enraged the rabid Protestants of New England and suggest
that the arch-imperialists in London were more tolerant than the local Anglo-
Saxons.65 Slavery was abolished by legislation in the British Empire a generation
before the Civil War in the United States. Although there were very few black
slaves living in British North America in the 1830s, there is certainly something
to be said in favour of an empire capable of and willing to extirpate an
entrenched economic system. Moreover, London sometimes tried to restrain the
greed of white settlers throughout its far-flung empire: the reaction of whites in
the Thirteen Colonies to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had parallels in
Australia and southern Africa.66 In addition, the Aboriginal rights acknowledged
by the 1763 proclamation became entrenched in Canada’s constitution precisely
because Canada remained part of the empire after 1776.67
It is well known that Canada barred immigration by non-white British subjects
at a time when it aggressively recruited immigrants in the British Isles.68 But there
is also evidence that the British government tried to discourage Canada and the
empire’s other dominions from passing racist immigration laws. At the 1897
Colonial Conference, Joseph Chamberlain declared that racial equality and
colour-blindness were fundamental traditions of the British Empire. Today,
Chamberlain is primarily remembered as a jingoistic imperialist and the architect
of the Boer War. But his comments on the immigration laws of Canada and the
other dominions have a remarkably modern ring. Speaking at a gathering of colo-
nial premiers, Chamberlain said that colonies were right to make laws against the
entry of paupers or those who were demonstrably immoral but that it was wrong
to exclude just ‘because a man is of a different colour than us’. He asked Wilfrid
Laurier and the other delegates ‘to bear in mind the traditions of the Empire
which makes no distinction in favour of, or against, race or colour’. Chamberlain
also said that to exclude by reason of their colour or race, ‘all Her Majesty’s Indian
subjects ... would be an act so offensive to those peoples that it would be most
painful, I am quite certain, to Her Majesty to have to sanction it.’69
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In the decades after 1945, Canada became a much less racist country. Canada’s
ties with Britain also became less important in this period. Whether these two sets
of phenomena were coincidental is an open question. One hypothesis worth test-
ing is that the declining importance of the Empire-Commonwealth after 1945
and the concurrent worldwide decline in racism were two entirely unrelated
phenomena. Because Canada is now home to several ethnic groups that were
affected by these processes (natives, whites, not to mention many immigrants
from the Indian subcontinent), Canadian historians are ideally placed to study this
topic and make a major contribution to global history. The widespread assump-
tion that racism and British imperialism were connected is one that deserves to be
debated by Canadian historians rather than accepted uncritically.
The Dollars and Sense of Imperialism
Historians have other assumptions about empire that need to be re-examined.
The prevailing view sees empire as a mechanism for transferring wealth from the
colonies to the imperial power and suggests that the British Empire made the
people of the colonies poorer than they would have been in the absence of
empire. But the economics of empire were much more complex than the con-
ventional wisdom allows. Canadian historians seeking to place their country’s
experience in a global context should pay attention to the debate over the costs
and benefits of empire for Britain. The economic critique of imperialism can be
traced back to the 1790s when Jeremy Bentham advocated that Britain abandon
its remaining North American colonies on the grounds of national self-interest.70
Some cliometricians now argue that possessing a colonial empire involved mas-
sive overseas expenditure that slowed Britain’s economic growth at home.Other
historians reject the thesis that the British Empire was a ‘waste of money’ and
stress the commercial benefits of empire.71 For those of us whose primary inter-
est is the history of Canada, this academic debate is important. For one thing, the
tangible evidence of British expenditure in Canada is still visible: a massive
amount of British capital was tied up in works such as Halifax’s imposing Citadel
and Upper Canada’s Rideau Canal. Although they did little to benefit taxpayers
in Britain, these expenditures stimulated the local economy at an early stage in
its development. In this sense, people in present-day Canada benefited from
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being part of the British Empire in the same way people in Nunavut benefit
from Canadian military expenditure in the region.
In addition to British government expenditure in present-day Canada, we also
need to consider the sheer extent of British private investment in Canada. A
great deal of capital flowed from Britain to Canada during the life of the empire.
At least part of this inflow of money was due to Canada’s political status. Until
1914, empire borrowers tended to receive better terms in British capital markets
than fully sovereign debtors: Canada was like the Australasian Dominions and
unlike the United States in that it financed its development through heavy bor-
rowing in London.72 In the eyes of some left nationalist historians, this reliance
on London capitalists was plainly a bad thing.73 My own viewpoint is that we
need to gather more information before making ceteris paribus statements about
whether Canada’s remaining under the British flag after 1776 helped or harmed
its long-term economic prospects: cheap credit can be beneficial or dangerous
depending on the circumstances.
Imperial Legacies, Economic Culture and the Homo Economicus Model
Canada’s membership of the British Empire facilitated the import of capital from
Britain. But Britain did more than send money. It also implanted values that had
a significant and positive impact on Canada’s long-term economic performance.
The concept of economic culture needs to be integrated into our understanding
of the British legacy in Canada. In the 1990s, economists74 and business histori-
ans75 began to turn to culture to explain what neo-classical economic theory
cannot. David Landes emphasises cultural differences in The Wealth and Poverty of
Nations: Why Some are So Rich and Others are So Poor, noting that the most pros-
perous nations in the world are either western or Sinitic in culture.76 Gregory J.
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Clark has advanced a similar argument by suggesting that it was something in
eighteenth-century western workplace culture that allowed the west to escape
the Malthusian trap that had ensnared all human societies for the previous
100,000 years.77 Both writers reject the homo economicus assumption that human
nature is a universal constant. If cultural differences do help to determine which
countries are rich and which are poor, this forces us to re-examine our assess-
ments of the historical processes by which western and, in particular, British cul-
ture, was implanted in Canada. After all, if the British Empire laid the cultural
foundations of Canada’s present-day affluence, there is something to be said for
British imperialism.
The best-known proponent of the concept of economic culture is probably
Samuel Huntington. Huntington has advanced the highly controversial thesis
that the political and economic institutions of the United States are largely the
product of the values that British Protestants brought with them to the Thirteen
Colonies. He worries that the influx of Spanish-speakers will eventually convert
parts of the United States into extensions of Latin America (i.e., violent, poor,
and with an alleged Ibero-Catholic tendency towards dictatorships of either the
extreme left or the extreme right).78 One could argue that Huntington has
brought all culturalist interpretations of economic performance into disrepute
through his oversimplified and alarmist theories. But Canadian historians ought
to consider the far more nuanced framework provided by Lawrence Harrison.
Harrison displays a keen awareness of the national differences within the major
cultural zones of the western hemisphere and acknowledges the possibility of
rapid cultural evolution, using the transformation of Spain over the course of his
own academic career as a case in point. But in the final analysis, his interpreta-
tion is similar to that of Huntington: North America has outperformed Latin
America for cultural reasons.79 If Harrison’s thesis is right, it has important impli-
cations for how we study Canadian political and economic history.
Of course, culturalist or ‘neo-Weberian’ interpretations for national disparities
in wealth are controversial. Proponents of the NIE insist that institutional differ-
ences, such as insecure land tenure, provide simpler and therefore better expla-
nations for the gap between North and Latin America.80 Stanley Engerman and
Kenneth Sokoloff hold that non-cultural factors such as stronger democratic
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institutions and the early development of mass schooling in North America
drove the divergence in economic outcomes north and south of the Rio
Grande.81 Engerman and Sokoloff are very sceptical of cultural explanations, but
their own findings point to the importance of political culture in understanding
differences in income levels.82 ‘Legal origins theory’ gives us yet another lens for
examining the relationship between culture and economic growth. Canadian
historians should consider the argument that common-law jurisdictions generally
grow faster than civil-law ones because of differences in the values embedded in
legal systems.83
Canadian historians seeking to assess Britain’s impact on Canada’s socio-eco-
nomic evolution should consider all of these theories in charting their research
agendas. One adopter of the culturalist approach to Canadian economic history
is Marc Egnal. He argues that the gap in average living standards between New
England, French Canada, and the slave-owning South that developed between
1750 and 1850 was partly a function of New England’s superior cultural capac-
ity for economic growth.84 The great virtue of Egnal’s research is that he man-
ages to explore cultural differences without falling into the trap of seeing
anglophones and francophones in North America as two monolithic groups. The
culturalist approach to comparative economic history is intriguing and raises
many questions for historians interested in Canada’s relations with the Empire-
Commonwealth. Although small in the grand scheme of human cultural diver-
sity, the differences in economic and political culture between Britain and the
United States were and remain quite real. These cultural differences influence
everything from tort law to employment standards to the role of state in health
care. Comparing Canada with the other two societies of what J.B. Brebner called
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the North Atlantic Triangle85 would seem to be a good way of investigating the
evolution of the country’s economic culture. We need to know far more about
how membership in the Empire-Commonwealth influenced Canada’s eco-
nomic, political and business cultures in the days before America Inc. became
overwhelmingly dominant and Great Britain plc disappeared over the horizon.
Of course, investigating the differences between Canadian and American
politico-economic culture is complicated by the debris of yesterday’s theories. In
the 1960s, Gad Horowitz connected the relative strength of socialism in Canada
to the British connection by tracing a genealogy of collectivist ideas back to the
United Empire Loyalists. The many critics of Horowitz’s thesis regarding the intel-
lectual legacy of the Loyalists were probably right,86 especially since the political
culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain was as least as committed to
Dickensian laissez-faire as the United States.87 But while Britain’s drift to the (rela-
tive) left came only in the twentieth century, it occurred at a time when Britain
still exerted a strong influence on Canadian political culture. As a recent collection
of essays makes clear, the Commonwealth relationship was still a very important
one for Canadians in the middle of the twentieth century,88 the period in which
the influence of socialist ideas in Britain was at its very peak. Canadian historians
have only recently begun to investigate how the ideology of the Commonwealth
influenced Canadian reactions to the rise of social democracy in Britain.89
One promising avenue of future archival research is the influence of British
role models on the development of the Canadian welfare state. A possible topic
related to this theme is the relationship between Tommy Douglas, the so-called
‘father of medicare’, and Aneurin Bevan, the architect of Britain’s National
Health Service.90 Canadian discussions of British gun control and capital
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(New Haven, 1945).
86 G Horowitz, ‘Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation’, Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 32, no. 2 (1966), pp. 143–71; J. Ajzenstat and P.J. Smith,
‘The “Tory Touch” Thesis: Bad History, Poor Political Science’, in Mark Charlton and Paul Barker
(ed.), Crosscurrents, Contemporary Political Issues, 3rd edition (Toronto, 1998), pp. 84–90.
87 E. Wallace, ‘The Origin of the Social Welfare State in Canada, 1867–1900’, Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, vol. 16, no. 3 (1950), pp. 383–93.
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89 But see J. Naylor, ‘Canadian Labour politics and the British model, 1920–50’, in Buckner and
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punishment legislation are two other topics that might be studied. If Canada is
indeed ‘a Northern European welfare state in the worst sense of the term’ (to
quote Stephen Harper’s speech to a gathering of American neo-conservatives in
1997),91 this may be partly due to the very British connection he so loudly
praised in July 2006. The British legacy in Canada does indeed include a cul-
ture generally receptive to free enterprise and some of our military traditions.
But it also includes approaches to social policy and international law that set
Canada apart from the United States.
One suspects that if historians had provided the reading public with a more
complete view of the British impact on Canada, Mr Harper might have hesitated
to make the statements quoted at the start of this essay. After all, certain features
of Canadian society valued by people on the right can be traced to Britain, but
so can institutions popular with those on the left. Extending from John Cabot to
John Diefenbaker, the Anglo-Canadian special relationship laid down many
sedimentary layers. Its sheer complexity requires Canadian historians to draw
on multiple interpretive frameworks. The potential rewards for grappling with
the comparative literature include the chance to escape from the parochialism
inherent in ‘national history’.
The existing British World literature provides a good starting point, but his-
torians need to reconnect with socio-economic theory if we are to understand
Britain’s complex role in the making of Canada. Engaging with the theories
surveyed in this chapter would have the incidental effect of increasing the rel-
evance of Canadian historical writing to academics in other disciplines and to
the reading public. As the comments by Mr Harper quoted above indicate,
non-historians have not forgotten the importance of the British Empire in
Canadian history. Although the British impact on Canada was not as positive as
some neo-conservatives make out, it was probably much more beneficial than
the recent historiography would suggest. I hope that the tentative conclusions
provided in this chapter will generate future debate on the British Empire’s
contribution to the Canadian success story.
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